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1  Introduction 
Over the last decade, the interest in studying social capital has grown enormously among 
sociologists, political scientists and economists alike. This increased interest resulted in a 
growing awareness and understanding of the role social capital plays in economic, social and 
political development of societies. Much credit for popularizing research on social capital is 
owed to the work of Robert Putnam (1993) who found evidence of a strong relationship between 
civic participation (measured as membership in voluntary organizations) and the quality of 
government across Italian regions. Knack and Keefer (1997) found that, in cross-country 
perspective, higher density of trust is associated with higher growth. Knack and Keefer’s 
empirical analysis cements Coleman’s (1988) assertion that social capital, just like other forms of 
capital, is productive and facilitates the attainment of goals that otherwise would not be possible. 
Accordingly, high stock of social capital increases individuals’ ability and willingness to 
cooperate, improves monitoring and enforcement of contracts, and results in less information 
asymmetry. Social capital therefore lowers transaction costs, fosters innovation and 
dissemination of technology and thus leads to better economic outcomes. Offering an historical 
perspective on the issue, Greif (1994) argues that cultural underpinnings of social interactions in 
medieval societies played a crucial role in reducing free riding and opportunistic behavior.  
Despite the increasing recognition of the importance of social capital for economic outcomes, 
our understanding of factors that determine the stock of social capital – at individual or aggregate 
levels – is still very limited. The previous literature centers on measuring social capital (usually 
at the aggregate, national level) and investigating its impact on the variable of interest, typically 
economic and/or institutional development of countries. Little attention is given to analyzing the 
factors that determine the individual stock of social capital and/or explaining the sources of 
differences across countries.
1  
This paper constitutes one of the few attempts to bridge this gap. Its contribution is three fold. 
First, we present a new and previously unavailable comparative dataset featuring a number of 
alternative measures of social capital for a sample of 27 European countries: including the 
member countries of the European Union and countries that (at the time the data were collected) 
                                                 
1 Empirical studies of the determinants of social capital are fairly recent and tend to focus primarily on social 
capital in the United States. For a recent extensive overview of social capital literature, see Durlauf and Fafchamps 
(2004).    3
were all candidates for the EU membership. Second, we analyze the determinants of the 
individual stock of social capital
2, considering individual and aggregate (country specific) factors 
alike. Finally, we reconfirm the gap in the stock of social capital between developed Western 
countries and the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The existence of 
such a gap was highlighted by Paldam and Svendsen (2000) and Adam et al. (2004) who 
attribute it to the legacy of communism. Paldam and Svendsen, for example, posit that the 
communist regime destroyed most or all of the existing social capital in these countries, which 
helps account for the slow pace of transition after the regime collapsed. We present a more 
optimistic assessment. Our findings suggest that the gap in social capital between Western and 
Eastern European countries can be attributed to the lower level of economic development and the 
lower quality of institutions in the latter countries. As such, it should gradually disappear as the 
post-communist countries catch up with respect to their economic development and the quality 
of institutions. We also discuss, albeit very tentatively, the potential impact that EU enlargement 
can have on intra-European convergence in social capital levels.  
In a similar study, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) develop a theoretical model of 
individual-level investment in social capital and test it in the context of a single country: the 
United States. Our study confirms many of their key findings. However, because their analysis is 
limited only to a single country, it fails to shed light on cross-country differences in (individual 
and aggregate) stock of social capital. In contrast, an important innovation of our paper lies 
exactly in its use of large international samples of individual respondents, thus permitting the 
simultaneous identification of individual-level and societal-level determinants of social capital in 
Europe.  
Since the source of our data are multiple Eurobarometer surveys (commissioned by the 
European Commission), our analysis is necessarily constrained to the member countries of the 
EU and candidates for membership in the EU. Though there has been some research studying 
social capital in developed and transition countries separately,
3 to the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to systematically develop and jointly analyze measures applicable to both groups of 
                                                 
2 We employ the same definition as in micro-economic literature, according to which individual social capital 
consists of one’s social attributes that can be used to benefit while interacting with other individuals. For a detailed 
discussion, see Glaeser et al. (2002).  
3 With the exception of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, all candidate countries are former communist countries. 
This shared legacy of communism and central planning is one of their main distinguishing features in comparison to 
the old member countries of the EU. Therefore, the on-going post-communist transition process is an important 
aspect of our analysis.    4
countries, and moreover relate the analysis specifically to the enlargement process. So far, when 
studying the enlargement process or, more generally, the process of transition from communism 
to democracy and market economy, the focus has been on real and nominal convergence and 
convergence in formal institutions (i.e., laws and regulations). Informal institutions (i.e., norms, 
relationships, and rules of behavior) have not received much, if at all, attention.  
In this paper, we draw guidance from recent developments in the new institutional 
economics. That literature stresses the importance of informal institutions and their role in 
explaining differences across developed and less developed (both  developing and transition) 
countries (see North, 1990; Feige, 1997). Given that the formerly communist countries are still 
going through transformation, involving tremendous institutional restructuring, it is very 
important that informal institutions develop parallel to formal institutions, so that the two remain 
compatible. If this happens, the transaction costs of such institutional restructuring, expressed in 
the form of predatory activities such as corruption and tax evasion, will decrease (see Pejovich, 
2003). On the other hand, if formal and informal institutions are in conflict, more of such 
predatory activities may be expected, as shown empirically by Gërxhani (2004).  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature about 
social capital and its measurement. Section 3 introduces our data and explains the measures that 
we use. Section 4 provides empirical insights on the individual determinants of social capital. 
Section 5 completes the analysis by integrating individual- with aggregate-factors. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2  Social capital and its measurement 
2.1 A brief review of the literature 
As a consequence of the variety of aspects it covers, social capital is defined in various ways. 
Although the concept itself originates from Loury (1977) and later Bourdieu (1986), Coleman’s 
(1988) definition has become the most popular. Coleman, presenting a sociologist’s view, 
defines social capital as a component of human capital that allows members of a given society to 
trust one another and cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations. Putnam (1993: 
664-665), a political scientist, offers a broader definition of social capital as encompassing 
“features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together 
more effectively to pursue shared interests”. Stiglitz (2000), an economist, sees social capital –   5
consisting of tacit knowledge, networks and reputation – as a social means to tackle moral hazard 
and incentive issues. Broadly speaking, all these definitions refer to trust, cooperative behavior, 
and networks between groups, as essential components of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 
1997). In the presence of trust, cooperation will be easier and therefore the frequency and density 
of networks is expected to be higher.
4 Interaction through networks in turn enhances trust and 
cooperative ability. According to Dasgupta (1988), social capital can make economic 
transactions more efficient by giving parties access to more information, enabling them to 
coordinate activities for mutual benefit, and reducing opportunistic behavior through repeated 
transactions. In addition, Putnam (1993) argues that participation in civil associations can 
contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governments, both because of their 
‘internal’ effects on individual members and because of their ‘external’ effects on the wider 
polity. “Internally, associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and 
public-spiritedness. Externally, ‘interest articulation’ and ‘interest aggregation’ are enhanced by 
a dense network of secondary associations” (Putnam, 1993: 89-90).
5  
The economic and institutional development of a country may have an important 
influence on social capital. Agreeing with social psychologists, Greif (1994) argues that the level 
of development and the organization of an economy may determine whether societies develop 
‘collectivist’ or ‘individualist’ characteristics. The former tend to build up group-specific social 
capital (i.e., pertaining to one’s family, religious or ethnic group) and rely on informal 
enforcement, whereas the latter are based on interaction across groups who invest in generalized 
social capital and formal enforcement rules.  
At first instant, an analogy can be observed between Greif’s categorization of societies 
and the two groups of countries analyzed in this paper. Basically, it can be argued that because 
the EU member states (i.e., developed countries) are generally characterized by a high density of 
economic transactions among different groups; well-established institutions; high level of 
generalized trust and participation in civil associations; and a bottom-up structure of economic 
transactions, they fall into the category of individualist societies. Candidate countries (i.e., less 
developed countries), on the other hand, with more underground economy; corruption and state 
                                                 
4 The direction of causality is not clearly resolved, however. Gambetta (1990), for example, argues that trust 
follows rather than causes cooperation. 
5 Nevertheless, it is now widely recognized that social capital may also have less desirable consequences. For 
an extensive discussion, see Portes (1998).    6
failure; low level of generalized trust and participation in civil associations; and a top-down 
structure of economic transactions, come closest to Greif’s description of collectivist societies. 
However, with the exception of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, the rest of candidate countries are 
post-communist countries. Recent research on social capital in these countries has put forward a 
so-called dictatorship theory of missing social capital (see Raiser, 1999; Kunioka and Woller, 
1999; and Paldam and Svedsen, 2000, 2001). According to this theory, dictatorships destroy 
social capital, group-specific and generalized alike. Moreover, they create such conditions that 
when dictatorships collapse, societies may even accumulate ‘negative’ social capital, which in 
turn impedes economic growth. During the communist dictatorship in most of the candidate 
countries, ‘positive’ social capital decreased and ‘negative’ social capital built up. This 
‘negative’ social capital took the form of underground activities, corruption or organized crime. 
The gap, created by the sudden destruction of old institutions and the creation of new ones, 
provided a favorable environment for the persistence or even further accumulation of ‘negative’ 
social capital throughout transition.
6 
The dictatorship theory of missing social capital adds a new dimension to Greif’s 
categorization. Within the so-called collectivist societies, there are countries which due to the 
legacy of communism may possess neither generalized social capital nor group-specific social 
capital, and may even have an inherited stock of ‘negative’ social capital.  
Given the main argument in the literature that the generalized social capital is more 
beneficial to a society as a whole in the long run, the focus of this paper is on this type of social 
capital.  
 
2.2 Measures of social capital 
7 
The previous literature attaches the label social capital quite liberally to a number of concepts 
that are not necessarily equivalent to each other. The following are the most popular empirical 
measures of generalized social capital:  
 
                                                 
6 The extent to which this ‘negative’ social capital (i.e., underground activities or corruption) has emerged 
varies per country. Rose (2000) relates it to the supremacy of the totalitarian regime these countries experienced 
during communism. The same line of argument can be found in Putnam et al. (1993), where the low level of social 
capital in South Italy is attributed to the long absolutist regime of the Kingdom of Sicily.   
7 For a critical review of empirical analysis of social capital, see Durlauf (2002).    7
1  Civic participation, generally captured by membership in voluntary organizations, 
pioneered by Putnam’s (1993) seminal work on Italian regions. Through membership in 
voluntary organizations, one learns to interact with other people – both acquaintances and 
strangers – in a cooperative manner and to solicit their cooperation to achieve a shared 
objective.
8 As such, voluntary organizations introduce their members to advantages and 
practice of collective action (Olson, 1982). Later work further distinguishes between 
Putnamesque and Olsonian organizations (see Knack and Keefer, 1997). The former, such 
as educational, sport and art clubs, religious and charitable organizations, and youth 
groups, allow their members to build up social capital and pursue common goals without 
imposing negative externalities on the rest of the society. The latter, including political 
parties and movements, trade unions, professional associations, and various interest 
groups, tend to engage in collective action that may reconfigure redistribution systems in 
their favor at the expense of the rest of the society. Therefore, in contrast to Putnamesque 
groups, which are thought to play a positive role in the society, the impact of Olsonian 
groups may be distinctly negative.  
2  Trust, popularized by Fukuyama (1995), is the most commonly used empirical measure of 
social capital. Its empirical popularity is largely due to the availability of extensive cross-
country survey data on generalized trust (collected within the framework of the the World 
Value Surveys program). Typically, trust is defined as the extent to which people find 
strangers trustworthy.  
3  Density of networks as a measure of the density of ties between individuals. Depending 
on whether the ties are within one group or across different groups, networks can be 
classified as informal and formal (or specific and general), respectively. The latter include 
also alumni associations and clubs such as the Rotary Club, in which case it can be argued 
that formal networks may partially overlap with membership in voluntary organizations. 
Informal networks, on the other hand, embody informal relations among friends, 
members of (extended) family, colleagues, and the like.  
                                                 
8 For instance, participating in team sports or playing an instrument in an orchestra requires an extraordinary 
degree of cooperation, coordination and discipline. The fans of The Simpsons television series may recall Lisa 
Simpson’s unsuccessful attempt at individualism when playing the saxophone in a school orchestra, which illustrates 
this point rather well.    8
4  Philanthropic generosity (i.e., altruism). This measure is based on Putnam’s (2001) 
finding that the frequency of charitable contributions in the US over time has been highly 
correlated with membership in voluntary organizations.  
 
The following section provides a description of the data and methodology used, and the way 
social capital is operationalized in this paper.  
 
3  Social capital in Europe 
Our measures of social capital utilize several recent Eurobarometer surveys commissioned by the 
European Commission and carried out by Gallup Europe.
9 Two types of surveys are used. First, 
standard Eurobarometer surveys (henceforth EB) were carried out in the 15 countries that were 
members of the European Union at the time.
10 Second, as of 2000, similar surveys were carried 
out also in the candidate countries.
11 These surveys are referred to as Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer surveys (henceforth CCEB). The two survey modules are implemented using 
essentially the same methodology and frequently contain similar questions.
12 Importantly, three 
recent EB surveys (in 1998, 1999 and 2001) featured questions that address various aspect of 
social capital, and identical questions were included in the Spring 2002 CCEB survey. We can 
therefore carry out comparative analysis including both sets of countries.  
The EB/CCEB surveys featured questions that can be used to gauge three aspects of social 
capital: civic participation, access to social networks, and altruism (philanthropic generosity). 
Table 1 presents the aggregate figures.  
 
                                                 
9 We are grateful to Robert Manchin of The Gallup Organisation Europe for kindly making these data available 
to us. 
10 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
11 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Turkey. We refer to these countries as candidates for membership because that was their status at the 
time the surveys were carried out. Ten of these countries have become members of the EU as of May 2004. 
12 See WZB (2003). The surveys are carried out by means of face-to-face interviews, with approximately 1,000 
respondents per country, except the following countries: Germany (1,000 respondents in each West and East 
Germany), United Kingdom (additional 300 respondents in Northern Ireland), Poland and Turkey (2,000 
respondents each), and Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta (500 respondents each). The overall sample size thus is 
approximately 16,000 for the EB surveys and 14,000 for the CCEB. The same questionnaire is used in all countries 
of the respective group (EB or CCEB), the questionnaire is translated and interviewers are local staff. The surveys 
are constructed so as to be broadly representative at the national level. The data report East Germany and Northern 
Ireland as separate entities, and we retain this distinction.    9
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The first measure in Table 1 is the average civic participation, or membership in voluntary 
organizations. Specifically, the respondents were asked: “From the following list, could you tell 
me in which of these organizations do you actively participate?”. The list of organizations 
included charities (social, communal or religious); religious or parish organizations other than 
charities; cultural or artistic organizations; trade unions or political parties; human rights 
movements or organizations; organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the 
environment; youth organizations such as scouts or youth clubs; consumer organizations; sports 
clubs and associations; hobby clubs; and other clubs or organizations. It should be stressed that 
the question asks the respondents to list those organizations in which they actively participate. 
We believe that active participation is crucial for the link between membership in voluntary 
organizations and social capital: one builds up social capital through interacting with fellow 
members and participating in common activities, not by paying membership dues and holding a 
membership card. Unfortunately, the question only records each type of organization, thereby 
disregarding multiple memberships in similar organizations (for example, one may be a member 
of two or three different sports clubs). As the survey asked about membership in 11 types of 
organizations (including an ‘other’ category), the maximum value that this variable can attain is 
11.  
In the adjacent columns, we have split the membership count into Putnamesque and Olsonian 
variables. The former are charities; religious or parish organizations other than charities; cultural 
or artistic organizations; youth organizations; sports clubs and associations; hobby clubs; and 
other clubs or organizations. The latter include trade unions or political parties; human rights 
movements or organizations; organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the 
environment; and consumer organizations.  
No question on trust was included in the Eurobarometer surveys. For comparative purposes, 
the last two columns of the first part of Table 1 report country averages of level of generalized 
trust as measured by the two most recent rounds of the World Value Surveys: WVS1990 and 
WVS1996. Specifically, the figures measure the fraction of respondents who in response to the 
following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that   10
you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” declared that most people could be trusted. 
This is, however, not a measure we use to analyze social capital.
13  
The first three columns of the second part of Table 1 present measures of access to social 
networks that one can rely on in need. Specifically, respondents were asked: “If you had any of 
the following problems (you were feeling depressed; you needed help finding a job for yourself 
or a member of your family; or you needed to borrow money to pay an urgent bill, like 
electricity, gas, rent or mortgage) is there anyone you could rely on to help you, from outside 
your own household?”. As these three networks are rather different in nature, we codify each as a 
separate binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has access to the network in question and 0 
otherwise.  
The last two columns of the second part of the table report the average extent of altruism 
among the respondents, based on the following two questions: “Now thinking about poor or 
socially excluded people, in the last twelve months, have you done the following (given money or 
goods to poor or socially excluded people; given up some of your time to help poor or socially 
excluded people) at least once a month, less often or have you not done it?”. The answers are 
coded as 0 for those who have never contributed money or given up their time, 1 for those who 
have done so less than once a month, and 2 for those who have done so more often.  
The figures for each measure of social capital are presented in descending order. The average 
figures for the EU members (before the latest enlargement) and the candidate countries are also 
included. There are clear similarities in the ordering of countries. Whether the various indicators 
measure the same underlying phenomenon (i.e., social capital) or not can be assessed by means 
of simple correlation analysis. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the various measures at 
the aggregate level. Clearly, civic participation is very closely correlated with aggregate 
generalized trust: the correlation coefficients between trust and average participation, 
Putnamesque and Olsonian groups are all close to 0.8. The correlation analysis further suggests 
that Putnamesque and Olsonian groups are not necessarily that different: countries with high 
                                                 
13 Some argue that generalized trust is not an adequate measure of social capital, because it does not 
differentiate between trust and trustworthiness (see Bornhorst et al., 2004), and because it is context-dependent. For 
example, in an ethnically polarized society, a member of the minority group – even if perfectly trustworthy- will 
often neither be trusted by the majority of population nor him(her)self trust the members of the majority. In addition, 
the same individual would report considerably different generalized trust depending on the wording (or 
understanding) of the question: he or she would report high trust vis-à-vis members of own group but low trust vis-à-
vis members of the majority group. For a noteworthy study, using experimental and field methods to measure both 
concepts of trust and trustworthiness, see Glaeser et al. (2002).    11
participation in one group also display high levels of participation in the other. Similarly, both 
groups are closely correlated with generalized trust. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, 
we retain the distinction between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups in the remainder of our 
analysis.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Countries where social networks are more prevalent tend to display also high levels of civic 
participation. A similarly high degree of correlation holds between networks and generalized 
trust. The only indicator that stands out as largely orthogonal to either civic participation or 
generalized trust is altruism. In contrast to Putnam’s (2001) finding, our data find both measures 
as being at best weakly correlated with the remaining variables.  
Finally, based on Table 1, two observations can be made about the distribution of social 
capital across countries. First, of all the indicators listed in Table 1 except giving up one’s time 
to help the poor and socially excluded, all show the EU member countries as having on average 
higher stock of social capital than the candidate countries. Given that the vast majority of the 
candidate countries are post-communist countries, this observation seems to confirm the 
assertion of Paldam and Svendsen (2000, 2001) and Adam et al. (2004) that communism 
destroyed social capital by discouraging social interactions outside one’s immediate network of 
friends and family. Second, there is a considerable degree of variation within both groups of 
countries – some candidate countries have very favorable endowments of social capital whereas 
some EU member countries fare rather poorly. A detailed analysis is provided in the following 
sections. 
 
4  Individual determinants of social capital 
In section 2, we described three types of indicators – civic participation, social networks, and 
altruism – that, as argued in the literature, are predicted to be closely correlated with the stock of 
social capital. Based on our data, we showed that at the aggregate level, civic participation and 
social networks are indeed closely correlated with each other as well as with generalized trust, 
whereas correlation is at best weak vis-à-vis altruism. The high correlation of our measures of 
civic participation and networks with generalized trust – the variable used most frequently to   12
study social capital – makes us confident about using these two measures to analyze factors that 
determine individual stock of social capital.  
We view social capital as a productive asset that is built up through investment: it takes time, 
effort and often a financial outlay to accumulate social capital. Once built up, as with other types 
of capital (physical and human), social capital generates a return, depreciates over time, and 
needs to be kept up to prevent it from depreciating and becoming obsolete. An individual’s 
investment in social capital therefore is expected to depend on the individual’s socio-economic 
characteristics, in particular age, family background, level of human capital (education and 
occupation), and income (see Coleman, 1988). While our approach in this paper is purely 
empirical, this notion of social capital can be supported by standard economic theory, as is done 
by Glaeser et al. (2002), whereby the individual’s stock of social capital is the outcome of an 
individual maximization problem with limited resources. In addition, in line with our discussion 
in section 2, we also consider aggregate determinants of social capital such as economic 
development and quality of institutions. The latter (e.g., the rule of law or corruption) are likely 
to affect the return on investment in any type of capital, including the social one. Individuals in 
countries with poor institutions, therefore, may be discouraged from investing and, in turn, will 
acquire less generalized social capital than their counterparts in countries with better institutional 
environment. According to Paldam (2002), more corruption leads to lower generalized trust. He 
argues that corruption is by far the best available measure of ‘negative’ social capital.  
The dependent variables are the two measures introduced in section 3: civic participation, 
and social networks.
14 As very few individuals participate in more than 3 organizations, we 
recoded civic participation so that it takes values 0, 1, 2, or 3, with the last being ascribed to 
anyone who participates in three or more organizations. The participation in Putnameque and 
Olsonian groups was recoded in the same way. Social networks remain defined as above: zero-
one dummy variables indicating access to the respective network.  
As a first step, we relate the individual stock of social capital to various individual-level 
socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, residency 
in urban vs. rural areas, and income. To account for country-specific factors, we also include 
                                                 
14 Despite the low correlation of altruism with either civic participation or social networks, using the two 
measures of helping the poor and socially excluded yields results broadly similar to those obtained with civic 
participation and social networks. Because of both space considerations and the slightly lower confidence that we 
have in this measure being indicative of the stock of social capital, the results obtained with altruism are not reported 
here. They can be obtained from the authors upon request.    13
country dummies (East Germany and Northern Ireland are reported as separate entities in the EB 
data sets; because of the potentially special nature of these two regions, we retain this 
distinction). Table 3 reports the regression results obtained with civic participation for the 
candidate countries
15, while Table 4 presents those for the EU member states. Because of the 
potentially important difference between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, we carry out the 
regression analysis first with overall participation and then separate it into the two types of 
voluntary organizations.  
 
TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE 
 
Looking first at the overall civic participation, a number of individual characteristics appear 
to shape individual investment in social capital, and these determinants tend to be similar in the 
candidate and member countries of the EU. Education is particularly important: respondents with 
secondary or university education or those who are still studying are more likely to actively 
participate in voluntary organizations than those with primary education (the omitted category). 
Overall civic participation increases also with income: more well-to-do individuals tend to 
acquire more in social capital than those who are less affluent. Civic participation seems to 
follow a hump-shaped path over an individual’s lifetime – this pattern is not significant for the 
candidate countries, however.
16 The unemployed, retirees, house-persons, and females tend to 
display significantly lower levels of overall civic participation.  
When comparing participation in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, only a few differences 
emerge. Education and income are positively correlated with active participation in both types of 
groups. The age profile of social capital over one’s lifetime is more pronounced and steeper for 
Olsonian groups – participation in collective action aimed at distributive objectives increases and 
subsequently falls more dramatically with age than participation in Putnamesque groups. The 
unemployed, retirees, house-persons and females, on the other hand, tend to stay away more 
from Olsonian groups than from Putnamesque ones – they pursue their interests and hobbies but 
                                                 
15 Turkey is not included in our analysis because it differs from the other candidate countries in many 
important aspects such as the level of development, cultural and religious traditions, and because of its unclear status 
with respect to membership in the EU. Nonetheless, including Turkey in the regressions or omitting also Cyprus and 
Malta (which do not share the post-communist legacy characteristic of the other candidate countries) produce 
qualitatively very similar results and are therefore not reported here but can be obtained upon request.  
16 It peaks around the of age of 50 for the EU members and 70 for the candidates, and subsequently declines.    14
not distributional objectives. Married people are less likely to participate in Putnamesque groups 
but more likely to get organized in Olsonian ones. The self-employed and white-collar workers, 
finally, tend to participate more often in Putnamesque rather than in Olsonian groups.
17  
Using access to social networks (i.e., networks outside the immediate household) instead of 
civic participation leads to very similar results, as Tables 5 and 6 reveal. The most notable 
difference is the effect of age. In both member states and candidate countries, older individuals 
tend to have more limited access to social networks. The relationship may be U-shaped, whereby 
the decline in access slows down at a higher age.
18 Women have an easier time to find 
consolation when depressed and financial relief when in need of money – but are less likely than 
men to find a job using their social contacts. The remaining variables affect access to social 
networks in a manner very similar to their effect on civic participation: education, income, being 
a student, self-employed, or a white-collar worker are all positively correlated with the 
availability of social networks. Being unemployed, on the other hand, translates into more 
limited access to social networks.  
 
TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE 
 
In summary, most of our findings show not only consistency across our two measures of 
social capital, but also similarity in the candidate and EU member countries. The positive 
relationship between education and the stock of social capital may indicate that social and human 
capital are complementary – individuals who acquire a high stock of one also invest in the 
other.
19 In addition, education may reduce the cost of investing in social capital by improving 
                                                 
17 We thought initially that this result for the self-employed may be due to the fact that the survey questionnaire 
did not feature professional associations and guilds (which are essentially Olsonian in nature) as a separate category; 
therefore, members of such associations would report participation in the ‘other’ category, which we included 
among Putnamesque groups. When looking at logit results for individual membership categories, we find that only 
in the EU member countries the self-employed are significantly more likely to report participation in ‘other’ 
organizations. The above-reported result indicating higher probability of the self-employed being members of 
Putnamesque groups, may be therefore driven by their more frequent participation in cultural, sports, hobby and 
human-rights organizations (further results on civic participation for individual categories of groups can be obtained 
from the authors upon request).  
18 The minimum point is reached at the age of 60-65 for the candidate countries and 98 for the current 
members. 
19 For an early evidence and discussion, see Coleman (1988).   15
one’s communication skills, or by generating positive externalities.
20 Regarding the positive 
effect of income, Glaeser et al. (2002) report a similar finding in their analysis based on US data, 
and find it puzzling as it contradicts their theoretical prediction that investment in social capital 
should fall with opportunity cost of time (wage). This finding could be reconciled by recognizing 
that obtaining social capital may require not only time but also monetary outlays. Furthermore, 
this result can be indicative of reverse causality. As income is contemporaneous to social capital 
(unlike education which is typically acquired at a relatively young age), finding positive 
correlation between income and social capital may simply document the positive impact of social 
capital on earnings.
21 The negative effect of being unemployed, retirees, house-persons and 
female on the stock of social capital reflects their exclusion from the labor market. These groups 
of individuals, especially females, are expected to have a higher stock of group-specific social 
capital than the generalized one (see Stoloff et al., 1999; and WB, 2002).  
Since the individual determinants of social capital are to a large extent very similar in the 
candidate and EU member countries, we hypothesize that country-specific factors play an 
important role in accounting for the apparent gap (cf. section 3), as insinuated by the high and 
significant country dummies in tables 3-6. In the next section, therefore, we consider aggregate 
determinants of social capital.  
 
5  Economic development and institutional quality 
In this section, we extend the analysis of determinants of individual stock of social capital by 
considering, alongside individual characteristics, aggregate factors such as economic 
development and the quality of institutions. In doing so, we hope to gain additional insights into 
the factors that underlie the formation of social capital at the individual level. Moreover, country-
specific economic and institutional conditions may help account for the gap in the level of social 
capital between the candidate countries and the member states of the EU.  
As we want to explain the differences in formation of social capital across countries, we 
merge the data for both candidate and member countries of the EU and include a dummy 
variable for the candidates (while dropping the country dummies). Obtaining a significant 
                                                 
20 This finding supports the view of those researchers who believe in a positive relationship between education 
and generalized social capital. For a discussion, see Helliwell and Putnam (1999). 
21 See Uslaner (1996), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Narayan and Pritchett (1999) for more evidence and 
detailed discussions.   16
coefficient on the ‘candidate’ dummy would indicate that there is indeed a gap between the 
candidates and members that cannot be explained by the variables included in the regression. 
At first, we run the regressions only with individual characteristics. These results are reported 
in Table 7, again for civic participation (overall active participation in voluntary organization as 
well as participation in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups), and for access to social networks. 
The impact of individual characteristics mirrors our previous findings: age, education, income, 
occupation and employment status are all important determinants of the individual stock of 
social capital (note, however, that in this merged data set the self-employed now display 
significantly lower civic participation whereas before the self-employed dummy appeared either 
with positive or insignificant coefficient). 
The results of the first regression, with overall civic participation, confirm the observation 
(based on country averages reported in Table 1) that the candidate countries lag significantly 
behind the EU member countries in their stock of social capital: the coefficient on the candidate 
dummy is negative and strongly significant. When distinguishing between Putnamesque and 
Olsonian groups, an interesting result appears: candidate countries do better than member 
countries with respect to participation in Putnamesque groups, but do worse in the case of 
Olsonian groups. The coefficient estimate, however, is much lower (in absolute value) for the 
former than for the latter. Hence, when the two types of groups are pooled together in ‘overall 
civic participation’, the lower participation in Olsonian groups more than offsets the effect of 
higher participation in Putnamesque ones, and the candidate countries thus appear to lag behind 
the member countries. This result is particularly interesting because it cannot be readily 
discerned from country averages in Table 1; in that table, candidate countries appear to lag 
behind with respect to both, Olsonian and Putnamesque groups. It is only after accounting for 
individual characteristics that this striking difference becomes apparent.  
A possible explanation for this finding is a general dissatisfaction with, and lack of trust in, 
formal political groups, parties, and unions in the candidate countries, and as a consequence a 
dislike for participation, and lower degree of unionization of the labor force. Both can be 
attributed to the legacy of communism (common to all candidate countries except Cyprus, Malta 
and Turkey) when political activity was not voluntary and trade unions were highly politicized 
and subordinated to the communist party.    17
The gap in social capital also appears when considering access to social networks: across all 
three sub-measures, the candidate countries appear to lag significantly behind the EU member 
countries.  
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
To assess the impact of country-level economic and institutional environment, we augmented 
the regressions with a number of aggregate indicators of economic development and institution 
quality: GDP per capita (in purchasing-power-parity terms); the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality; the Transparency International corruption-perception index (inverted so that higher 
values indicate lower corruption); the average of indexes of political freedom and civil liberties 
reported by the Freedom House (in alternative regression specifications, we replaced this 
democracy index with a measure of the fraction of years since 1972 that the country was 
classified by the Freedom House as free or partially free); economic freedom index compiled by 
the Frasier Institute; and the average economic growth over preceding three years. Though we 
tried several alternative regression specifications
22, the results are broadly similar and therefore 
we report, in Table 8, only one of the most general regression specifications, relating individual 
stock of social capital to economic development (proxied by per-capita GDP), income inequality, 
pervasiveness of corruption, and economic freedom.
23  
 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 
The most interesting finding is that once aggregate economic development and institutional 
quality are controlled for, the candidate countries are no longer different from the EU members 
with respect to their stock of social capital. Moreover, the candidate countries appear with a 
positive coefficient in the first three regressions, indicating that the candidate countries display 
significantly higher active participation in voluntary organizations, Putnamesque and Olsonian 
alike, than one would expect given their level of economic development and institutional quality. 
In fact, already when controlling only for the GDP per capita, the significance of the candidate 
                                                 
22 Additional results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
23 Note that we adjusted the standard errors for the fact that aggregate and individual variables are measured at 
different levels of aggregation.    18
dummy is driven below conventional levels, or the dummy appears significantly positive, in all 
six regressions (specifically, the dummy appears with a significantly positive coefficient in the 
regression with Putnamesque groups, and not significant otherwise).  
The impact of country-specific economic and institutional conditions is in line with what one 
would generally expect. Higher per-capita income tends to be associated with more frequent 
civic participation, although the pattern often appears not significant when additional aggregate 
indicators are included in the regression (as is the case in the regressions reported in Table 8). 
Individuals in countries with high income inequality and especially widely-spread corruption 
(the strongest significant variable) tend to acquire less social capital. Economic freedom seems to 
encourage investment into social capital.  
These patterns are very intuitive. Income inequality reflects the intensity of social conflict in 
the country (see Knack and Keefer, 1997 and Rodrik, 1999). Socially polarized countries, not 
surprisingly, end up with lower investment in generalized social capital. Rampant corruption and 
extensive regulation of the economy reduce the returns on any kind of investment, whether it is 
into social capital or other productive capacities. Therefore, both formal and informal institutions 
(economic freedom belonging to the former, while corruption being an expression of the latter) 
matter for individual acquisition of generalized social capital.  
Finally, it is reassuring to note that the individual socio-demographic attributes (education, 
occupation, unemployment and income) remain strongly significant after controlling for 
aggregate determinants of social capital. Hence, both individual and aggregate factors play 
important roles in underlying individual decisions on acquiring social capital.  
 
6  Conclusion 
Using recent Eurobarometer surveys, this paper presents new and previously unavailable 
comparative data featuring a number of alternative measures of social capital for a sample of 27 
European countries: including the member countries of the European Union and countries that at 
the time the data were collected were candidates for the EU membership (mainly Central and 
Eastern European countries). Focusing on civic participation and access to social networks as 
two key measures of social capital, we analyze the determinants of the individual stock of social 
capital, considering individual (i.e., socio-demographic characteristics) and aggregate (i.e., 
economic development and quality of institutions) factors alike. The results confirm important   19
differences in the stock of social capital between these two groups of countries within Europe. 
The analysis reveals, however, that while the stock of social capital at the individual level is 
affected by very similar factors in both groups of countries, the differences in individual-level 
determinants cannot fully account for the gap at the aggregate level. Once we also include 
aggregate measures of economic development and quality of institutions, the gap disappears. 
This finding thus indicates that the low average stock of social capital in Central and Eastern 
European countries can be attributed to the lower level of economic development and the lower 
quality of institutions in candidate countries. With respect to the latter, the effect of corruption 
seems to be particularly important.  
Although a convergence in formal institutions between the member states and the candidate 
countries has to a large extent been accomplished, there remains a mismatch between these 
‘harmonized’ formal institutions and the existing informal institutions in the candidate countries 
(see Pejovich, 2003, for a broader discussion). This lack of correspondence, embodied in the 
form of corruption and other predatory activities, may be the underlying reason of the persisting 
significant divergence with respect to social capital. This argument can be reinforced by our 
finding that the participation of candidate countries in Olsonian groups (formal political groups 
and parties, or unions) is much lower than in Putnamesque groups, reflecting individuals’ lack of 
trust in formalized institutions.  
The expectation is that the enlargement of the European Union will contribute to more open 
democratic governments and policies in the candidate countries. This will, in turn, promote 
public policies that discourage rent-seeking, motivate a rewarding scheme of leaderships based 
on performance, generalized public trust on state’s actions, and civic spirit. Thus, once Central 
and Eastern European countries catch up with the West in terms of economic development and 
institutions, they are very likely to close the gap in social capital as well. For this to be possible, 
however, a gradual harmonization of formal rules and informal norms between the two groups of 
countries should be of primary importance. 
Finally, our analytical framework does not facilitate comprehensive resolution of causality 
issues related to social capital (see Durlauf, 2002). Importantly, causality cannot go from 
individual stock of social capital to aggregate economic development and institutions, as each 
individual is too small to have much impact on aggregate outcomes. Moreover, it is indisputable 
that the transition economies owe their unfavorable economic and institutional development   20
primarily to history and geography – having found themselves in the Soviet zone of influence at 
the end of the World War II. A question that poses a greater challenge is whether individual 
socio-economic characteristics determine individual stock of social capital or are in fact 
determined by it. Education and, though to a lesser extent, occupation are typically acquired at a 
relatively young age whereas social capital stock changes over one’s lifetime (as the impact of 
age on social capital discussed above suggests). Therefore causality is more likely to go from 
education and occupation to social capital rather than the other way around – although a 
simultaneous relationship cannot be excluded. However, social capital may have an important 
effect on one’s earnings and employment status (including the probability of becoming 
unemployed). Ideally, to resolve the question of causality satisfactorily, we would require 
longitudinal panel data where we could observe the evolution of both social capital and 
individual characteristics over time. Nevertheless, our interpretation of the observed correlation 
between individual socio-economic characteristics and social capital is consistent with the 
predictions of the theoretical model formulated by Glaesser et al. (2002). Therefore, we feel 
confident enough in interpreting the findings as indicative of causality going from individual 
socio-economic characteristics to individual stock of social capital, with the proviso that the 
relationship can be in fact simultaneous in some cases.    i
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Table 1: Alternative measures of social capital 
Average Participation  Olson Groups  Putnam Groups  Trust  WVS90  WVS96 
Sweden  2.00 Sweden  1.00 Netherlands  1.08 Sweden  66.10  56.59 
Denmark  1.78 Denmark  0.79 Sweden  1.00 Finland  62.72  47.92 
Netherlands  1.70 Netherlands  0.62 Denmark  0.99 Denmark  57.66  
Finland  1.24 Finland  0.44 N.  Ireland  0.81 Netherlands  53.47  
Luxembourg  1.03 Luxembourg  0.34 Finland  0.80 Ireland  47.37  
Czech Rep.  0.94  EU Average  0.28  Ireland 0.74  Great  Britain  43.68  29.09 
Germany  West  0.93 Austria  0.25 Germany  West  0.73 N.  Ireland  43.62  
EU Average  0.91  Great Britain  0.22  Czech Rep.  0.73  EU Average  41.16  37.74 
N.  Ireland  0.90 Czech  Rep.  0.21 Luxembourg 0.69  Germany  West 37.86  39.92 
Great  Britain  0.88 Slovakia  0.20 Great  Britain  0.67 Italy  35.30  
Austria  0.88 Cyprus  0.20 Slovakia  0.66 Poland  34.51  16.91 
Slovakia 0.86  Germany  West  0.19  EU Average  0.64  Spain 34.24  28.65 
Ireland  0.84 Belgium  0.17 Austria  0.63 Belgium  33.50  
Belgium  0.73 Turkey  0.15 Malta  0.57 Austria  31.82  
Cyprus  0.72 Slovenia  0.14 Slovenia  0.56 Lithuania  30.80  21.31 
Slovenia  0.70 Malta  0.13 Belgium  0.56 Bulgaria  30.40  23.69 
Malta 0.69  CC Average  0.12  Cyprus  0.53 Czech  Rep.  30.25  
France  0.58 Germany  East  0.12 Estonia  0.48 Estonia  27.58  21.06 
Estonia  0.57 France  0.10 France  0.48 Germany  East  25.60  24.28 
CC Average  0.55  Hungary 0.10  CC Average  0.42  Hungary 24.59   
Germany  East  0.54 Estonia  0.10 Germany  East  0.42 CC Average  23.96  18.28 
Italy  0.49 Ireland  0.10 Italy  0.40 Slovakia  23.01  
Lithuania  0.48 N.  Ireland  0.10 Lithuania  0.39 France  22.79  
Latvia  0.47 Italy  0.09 Latvia  0.38 Portugal  21.67  
Turkey  0.43 Latvia  0.09 Hungary  0.30 Latvia  19.05  23.92 
Hungary  0.40 Lithuania  0.09 Spain  0.29 Slovenia  17.39  15.54 
Poland  0.35 Romania  0.08 Portugal  0.29 Romania  16.07  
Spain  0.35 Poland  0.07 Poland  0.28 Turkey  9.98  5.50 
Portugal  0.34 Spain  0.06 Turkey  0.28 Cyprus     
Greece  0.31 Greece  0.05 Greece  0.26 Greece     
Romania  0.29 Portugal  0.05 Romania  0.21 Luxembourg     
Bulgaria  0.18 Bulgaria  0.05 Bulgaria  0.13 Malta       iv
Table 1 (continued)  
Network: Depressed  Network: Job  Network: Money  Altruism: Money Altruism:  Time 
Ireland  0.93 Ireland  0.86 Ireland  0.91 N.  Ireland  1.29 Romania  0.67 
Netherlands  0.92 Spain  0.80 Spain  0.91 Malta  1.22 Cyprus  0.64 
Spain  0.92 Netherlands  0.79 Sweden  0.90 Ireland  1.17 Luxembourg  0.56 
Sweden  0.91 Luxembourg  0.74 Netherlands  0.88 Netherlands  1.09 Finland  0.55 
Denmark  0.90 Denmark  0.74 Denmark  0.87 Romania  1.08 Netherlands  0.54 
Slovakia  0.90 Austria  0.74 N.  Ireland  0.85 Cyprus  0.93 Ireland  0.51 
N.  Ireland  0.89 N.  Ireland  0.74 Finland  0.84 Luxembourg  0.93 Slovenia  0.50 
Great  Britain  0.88 Portugal  0.73 Italy  0.82 Great  Britain  0.92 Turkey  0.49 
France  0.87 Great  Britain  0.72 Czech  Rep. 0.80  Italy  0.92 Austria  0.49 
Czech Rep.  0.86 Slovenia  0.72 EU Average  0.80  Poland 0.89  Hungary  0.43 
EU Average  0.86  Italy  0.70 France  0.79 Lithuania  0.89 N.  Ireland  0.42 
Luxembourg 0.86  EU Average  0.70  Slovakia  0.79 Spain  0.87 Poland  0.40 
Italy  0.85 France  0.69 Slovenia  0.79 EU Average  0.84  EU Average  0.40 
Finland 0.85  Czech  Rep. 0.67  Portugal 0.79  Finland 0.84  CC Average  0.39 
Austria  0.84 Sweden  0.66 Great  Britain  0.79 Turkey  0.82 Italy  0.39 
Malta  0.84 Belgium  0.65 Luxembourg  0.78 Greece  0.82 Greece  0.38 
Portugal  0.84 Hungary  0.63 Estonia  0.77 Austria  0.78 Malta  0.38 
Poland  0.83 Finland  0.61 Poland  0.76 France  0.75 Portugal  0.37 
Belgium  0.81 Germany  West  0.61 Austria  0.76 Sweden  0.74 Lithuania  0.35 
Germany  West  0.80 Cyprus  0.59 Hungary  0.73 CC Average  0.73  Latvia 0.34 
Hungary  0.80 Greece  0.56 Greece  0.70 Denmark  0.72 Belgium  0.33 
Slovenia 0.78  Germany  East  0.54  CC Average  0.70  Slovenia 0.70  Spain  0.33 
Germany  East  0.78 Poland  0.53 Lithuania  0.68 Portugal  0.66 Great  Britain  0.32 
CC Average  0.78  CC Average  0.53  Romania  0.68 Belgium  0.65 Germany  East  0.32 
Estonia  0.77 Slovakia  0.51 Germany  West  0.68 Hungary  0.65 Denmark  0.31 
Lithuania  0.77 Lithuania  0.50 Bulgaria  0.67 Germany  East  0.60 Germany  West  0.31 
Romania  0.73 Malta  0.50 Belgium  0.66 Latvia  0.59 France  0.30 
Turkey  0.71 Estonia  0.49 Cyprus  0.65 Germany  West  0.57 Sweden  0.30 
Latvia  0.71 Turkey  0.48 Germany  East  0.62 Slovakia  0.52 Slovakia  0.26 
Bulgaria  0.70 Romania  0.45 Latvia  0.60 Czech  Rep.  0.45 Estonia  0.22 
Cyprus  0.70 Latvia  0.40 Turkey  0.58 Estonia  0.41 Czech Rep.  0.20 
Greece  0.69 Bulgaria  0.37 Malta  0.56 Bulgaria  0.32 Bulgaria  0.16 
   v
Notes:  
Average participation is the average number of voluntary organizations in which respondents actively participate. Putnam groups are charities, religious 
organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian 
groups are trade unions or political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the environment, 
and consumer organizations. The maximum possible value is 11 for average participation, 7 for Putnam groups and 4 for Olson groups. Network variables take 
the value of one if the respondents feel she has someone (besides the members of her immediate household) to rely on when feeling depressed, in need of a new 
job for herself or a family member, or to borrow money urgently, and zero otherwise. Altruism variables measure whether the respondent contributed money or 
gave up some of her time during the preceding 12 months to help poor or socially excluded people. It takes values of 0 (never), 1 (less than once a month) and 2 
(more than once a month). These variables are based on the following surveys: EB50.1 (1998) for average participation, EB56.1 (2001) for networks, EB52.1 for 
altruism, and CCEB 2002.1 for all three types of variables for the candidate countries. See the text for further details and the precise wording of the relevant 
questions. We are grateful to the Gallup Organisation Europe for kindly making these data available to us. 
Trust is based on the World Value Surveys rounds of 1990 and 1996-97. The numbers correspond to the fraction of the respondents who declare that most people 
can be trusted. Blank cell indicates that the country did not participate in that survey round and therefore no data are available.    vi
Table 2: Correlation matrix with alternative measures of social capital  
 
Average 
Participation 
Olson 
Groups 
Putnam 
Groups 
Network: 
Depressed 
Network: 
Job 
Network: 
Money 
Altruism: 
Money 
Altruism: 
Time 
Trust 
(WVS90) 
Olson Groups  0.937            
Putnam Groups  0.949  0.779          
Network: Depressed  0.594  0.443  0.665        
Network: Job  0.451  0.297  0.543  0.753       
Network: Money  0.529  0.452  0.539  0.792  0.742      
Altruism: Money  0.145  0.039  0.228 0.295 0.373 0.167       
Altruism: Time  0.059  0.047  0.067 -0.108  0.204 -0.022  0.649     
Trust (WVS90)  0.804  0.748  0.767 0.653 0.463 0.671 0.309 0.014   
Trust (WVS96)  0.836  0.790  0.805 0.624 0.344 0.566 0.038  -0.088  0.915 
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Table 3: Individual determinants of civic participation in candidate countries 
  Overall Civic 
Participation  std. error  Putnam 
Groups  std. error  Olsonian 
Groups  std. error 
Female -0.275***  (0.049) -0.258*** (0.052) -0.200*** (0.073)
Married  -0.131** (0.059) -0.173*** (0.063) 0.082 (0.091)
Age  0.013 (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) 0.086*** (0.017)
Age  squared  -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0007*** (0.0002)
Children -0.022  (0.025) -0.022 (0.027) -0.038 (0.039)
HH  Size  -0.030 (0.024) -0.019 (0.026) -0.060 (0.037)
Secondary  0.297*** (0.081) 0.286*** (0.087) 0.426*** (0.141)
University  0.763*** (0.090) 0.717*** (0.096) 0.873*** (0.149)
Student  1.225*** (0.139) 1.355*** (0.145) 0.668*** (0.245)
Self-employed  0.214* (0.116) 0.404*** (0.121) -0.077 (0.155)
White  collar  0.123* (0.075) 0.190** (0.080) 0.050 (0.099)
House person  -0.439***  (0.117) -0.146 (0.122) -1.177*** (0.229)
Unemployed   -0.424***  (0.114) -0.296** (0.123) -0.613*** (0.185)
Retiree  -0.358*** (0.095) 0.018 (0.100) -1.050*** (0.149)
Farmer/fisherman -0.191  (0.206) 0.023 (0.230) -0.329 (0.311)
UE History: 1  -0.359***  (0.083) -0.303*** (0.088) -0.297** (0.124)
UE History: 2+  -0.258**  (0.107) -0.137 (0.111) -0.446*** (0.180)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.103  (0.080) 0.077 (0.085) 0.186  (0.131)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.313***  (0.082) 0.254*** (0.087) 0.315**  (0.132)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.378***  (0.089) 0.359*** (0.094) 0.263*  (0.143)
Small/Medium town  -0.093  (0.058) -0.132** (0.061) -0.003 (0.086)
City -0.350***  (0.064) -0.347*** (0.068) -0.258*** (0.098)
Cyprus  1.632*** (0.149) 1.881*** (0.166) 1.104*** (0.212)
Czech Rep.  1.924*** (0.131) 2.141*** (0.150) 1.185*** (0.185)
Estonia  1.124*** (0.130) 1.425*** (0.150) 0.312 (0.196)
Hungary  0.998*** (0.130) 1.168*** (0.150) 0.680*** (0.186)
Latvia  1.044*** (0.127) 1.317*** (0.149) 0.330* (0.196)
Lithuania  1.100*** (0.133) 1.392*** (0.154) 0.128 (0.210)
Malta  1.605*** (0.163) 1.968*** (0.178) 0.874*** (0.244)
Poland  0.522*** (0.123) 0.748*** (0.145) 0.164 (0.185)
Romania  0.425*** (0.134) 0.531*** (0.160) 0.230 (0.198)
Slovakia  2.047*** (0.127) 2.276*** (0.145) 1.296*** (0.182)
Slovenia  1.501*** (0.126) 1.704*** (0.147) 0.800*** (0.186)
Log likelihood  -7,596.218  -6,625.982 -3273.130 
Pseudo R2  0.080  0.084 0.082 
Wald χ
2  1224.67*** 1,093.05*** 562.47*** 
No. of observations  8,899  8,901 8,899 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Civic participation is measured as 
active participation in voluntary organizations (see the text for precise wording of the question and list of organizations). 
Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, youth organizations, sports clubs and 
associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian groups are trade unions or political parties, human 
rights movements or organizations, organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer 
organizations.  
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Table 4: Individual determinants of civic participation in member states 
  Overall Civic 
Participation  std. error  Putnam 
Groups  std. error  Olsonian 
Groups  std. error 
Female -0.242***  (0.041) -0.215*** (0.042) -0.166*** (0.054)
Married 0.020  (0.050) -0.022 (0.050) 0.228***  (0.070)
Age 0.041***  (0.007) 0.022*** (0.008) 0.081***  (0.012)
Age squared  -0.0004***  (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001)
Children -0.031  (0.031) -0.071** (0.032) 0.120***  (0.044)
HH Size  0.027  (0.022) 0.074*** (0.023) -0.159***  (0.035)
Secondary 0.291***  (0.057) 0.261*** (0.059) 0.328***  (0.082)
University 0.837***  (0.064) 0.728*** (0.067) 0.789***  (0.088)
Student 1.015***  (0.098) 1.153*** (0.104) 0.355***  (0.143)
Self-employed -0.140  (0.090) 0.120 (0.089) -0.649*** (0.123)
White collar  0.090  (0.059) 0.116* (0.061) -0.037  (0.074)
House person  -0.199***  (0.080) 0.034 (0.081) -0.690***  (0.113)
Unemployed   -0.165*  (0.090) -0.020 (0.092) -0.332***  (0.123)
Retiree -0.095  (0.081) 0.164* (0.085) -0.521***  (0.112)
Farmer/fisherman 0.291**  (0.150) 0.407*** (0.163) 0.096  (0.217)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.249***  (0.060) 0.195*** (0.062) 0.269***  (0.084)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.649***  (0.064) 0.551*** (0.065) 0.644***  (0.091)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.756***  (0.069) 0.636*** (0.071) 0.723***  (0.098)
Denmark 1.716***  (0.110) 0.952*** (0.113) 1.991***  (0.149)
Germany West  0.552***  (0.112) 0.645*** (0.113) 0.109  (0.165)
Greece -0.979***  (0.124) -0.914*** (0.127) -0.933*** (0.208)
Italy -0.415***  (0.129) -0.361*** (0.131) -0.409** (0.206)
Spain -0.697***  (0.134) -0.681*** (0.138) -0.722*** (0.226)
France -0.285***  (0.115) -0.173 (0.118) -0.584*** (0.182)
Ireland 0.520***  (0.131) 0.657*** (0.135) -0.126  (0.207)
N-Ireland 0.501***  (0.177) 0.637*** (0.182) -0.233  (0.273)
Luxembourg 0.747***  (0.152) 0.537*** (0.146) 0.929***  (0.215)
Netherlands 1.753***  (0.112) 1.307*** (0.113) 1.753***  (0.154)
Portugal -0.688***  (0.128) -0.602*** (0.132) -0.950*** (0.221)
Great Britain  0.817***  (0.123) 0.736*** (0.124) 0.665***  (0.170)
Germany East  -0.202*  (0.113) -0.131 (0.116) -0.457*** (0.177)
Finland 1.143***  (0.108) 0.702*** (0.112) 1.455***  (0.149)
Sweden 2.073***  (0.143) 0.984*** (0.150) 2.620***  (0.184)
Austria 0.478***  (0.119) 0.408*** (0.119) 0.513***  (0.168)
Log likelihood  -1,1367.22  -10,210.34 -5,870.042 
Pseudo R2  0.127  0.081 0.198 
Wald χ
2  2,923.19*** 1,568.99*** 2,273.74 
No. of observations  10,699  10,699 10,699 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Civic participation is measured as 
active participation in voluntary organizations (see the text for precise wording of the question and list of organizations). 
Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, youth organizations, sports clubs and 
associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian groups are trade unions or political parties, human 
rights movements or organizations, organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer 
organizations.    ix
Table 5: Individual determinants of social networks in candidate countries 
  Networks if 
depressed  std. error  Networks if 
needs job  std. error  Networks to 
borrow  std. error 
Female  0.343*** (0.057) -0.119** (0.050) 0.081 (0.053)
Married  0.096 (0.070) 0.062 (0.062) 0.127* (0.066)
Age -0.059***  (0.011) -0.065*** (0.010) -0.071*** (0.010)
Age  squared  0.0004*** -0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0006*** -0.0001
Children  0.042 (0.027) 0.026 (0.025) 0.086*** (0.026)
HH Size  -0.156***  (0.027) -0.148*** (0.024) -0.181*** (0.025)
Secondary  0.091*** (0.079) 0.122* (0.075) 0.298*** (0.074)
University  0.275** (0.092) 0.349*** (0.086) 0.459*** (0.087)
Student  0.385** (0.172) 0.258* (0.146) 0.235 (0.157)
Self-employed  0.344 (0.159) 0.486*** (0.130) 0.636*** (0.161)
White  collar  0.098 (0.094) 0.217*** (0.078) 0.147* (0.088)
House  person  -0.084 (0.120) -0.203* (0.109) 0.011 (0.114)
Unemployed    -0.083 (0.113) -0.255*** (0.104) -0.084 (0.106)
Retiree  0.044 (0.106) -0.052 (0.095) -0.093 (0.100)
Farmer/fisherman -0.234  (0.224) 0.193 (0.197) -0.089 (0.213)
UE History: 1  -0.169**  (0.088) -0.320*** (0.077) -0.215*** (0.084)
UE History: 2+  -0.329***  (0.117) -0.296*** (0.104) -0.438*** (0.108)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.244***  (0.082) 0.278*** (0.079) 0.240***  (0.078)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.362***  (0.087) 0.399*** (0.081) 0.420***  (0.082)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.621***  (0.098) 0.866*** (0.089) 0.749***  (0.094)
Small/Medium town  -0.064  (0.067) -0.122** (0.060) -0.141** (0.063)
City -0.046  (0.073) -0.055 (0.066) -0.239*** (0.069)
Cyprus  -0.213 (0.138) 0.814*** (0.136) -0.312** (0.136)
Czech Rep.  0.815*** (0.147) 1.025*** (0.129) 0.339*** (0.137)
Estonia  0.030 (0.123) 0.154 (0.115) 0.162 (0.122)
Hungary  0.392*** (0.121) 1.072*** (0.112) 0.145 (0.116)
Latvia -0.191  (0.119) -0.113 (0.115) -0.536*** (0.114)
Lithuania -0.003  (0.131) 0.251** (0.123) -0.361*** (0.125)
Malta  0.750*** (0.173) 0.370** (0.154) -0.609*** (0.151)
Poland  0.629*** (0.112) 0.452*** (0.100) 0.285*** (0.105)
Romania  -0.087 (0.115) 0.233** (0.113) -0.189* (0.112)
Slovakia  1.209*** (0.154) 0.528*** (0.118) 0.447*** (0.128)
Slovenia  0.150 (0.128) 1.258*** (0.121) 0.221* (0.126)
Constant  2.470*** (0.299) 1.386*** (0.267) 2.648*** (0.285)
Log likelihood  -4,259.41  -4,938.50 -4,646.19 
Pseudo R2  0.055  0.092 0.057 
Wald χ
2  458.86*** 859.85*** 522.32*** 
No. of observations  8,625  7,852 8,303 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.  Networks variables take value 1 if the 
respondent can rely on other people outside their immediate household if she feels depressed, needs a job for herself or a 
family member, or needs to borrow money to pay an urgent bill.  
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Table 6: Individual determinants of social networks in member states 
  Networks if 
depressed  std. error  Networks if 
needs job  std. error  Networks to 
borrow  std. error 
Female 0.557***  (0.062) -0.043 (0.049) 0.191***  (0.056)
Married -0.052  (0.068) 0.046 (0.055) -0.003  (0.062)
Age -0.027***  (0.011) -0.039*** (0.009) -0.025*** (0.010)
Age squared  0.0001  (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0001  (0.0001)
Secondary 0.213***  (0.076) 0.172*** (0.063) 0.093  (0.070)
University 0.396***  (0.095) 0.293*** (0.073) 0.205***  (0.084)
Student 0.713***  (0.181) 0.378*** (0.131) 0.538***  (0.157)
Self-employed 0.257*  (0.146) 0.105 (0.114) 0.367***  (0.135)
White collar  0.303***  (0.100) 0.124* (0.075) 0.268***  (0.088)
House person  0.065  (0.124) -0.082 (0.092) 0.126  (0.107)
Unemployed   -0.272**  (0.117) -0.732*** (0.094) -0.315*** (0.104)
Retiree 0.023  (0.115) -0.115 (0.090) -0.040  (0.105)
Farmer/fisherman 0.459*  (0.278) -0.021 (0.215) -0.003 (0.239)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.304***  (0.081) 0.301*** (0.066) 0.225***  (0.073)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.391***  (0.090) 0.477*** (0.073) 0.529***  (0.084)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.548***  (0.104) 0.615*** (0.080) 0.652***  (0.093)
Small/Medium town  -0.063  (0.070) -0.140*** (0.057) -0.081 (0.064)
City 0.011  (0.077) -0.021 (0.062) 0.015  (0.070)
Denmark 0.695***  (0.162) 0.217* (0.130) 1.314***  (0.144)
Germany West  0.084  (0.144) -0.212* (0.126) 0.264**  (0.126)
Greece -0.494***  (0.141) -0.376*** (0.129) 0.345*** (0.130)
Italy 0.293*  (0.162) 0.256* (0.144) 0.957***  (0.152)
Spain 1.142***  (0.185) 0.665*** (0.144) 1.807***  (0.172)
France 0.606***  (0.160) 0.165 (0.131) 0.857***  (0.136)
Ireland 1.489***  (0.286) 0.806*** (0.187) 1.573***  (0.219)
N-Ireland 0.978***  (0.285) 0.310 (0.204) 1.344***  (0.243)
Luxembourg 0.447***  (0.182) 0.348** (0.155) 0.680***  (0.157)
Netherlands 1.228***  (0.200) 0.510*** (0.145) 1.628***  (0.175)
Portugal 0.316**  (0.157) 0.473*** (0.140) 0.874***  (0.143)
Great Britain  0.722***  (0.177) 0.326** (0.143) 0.959***  (0.150)
Germany East  -0.024  (0.140) -0.394*** (0.124) 0.068  (0.124)
Finland 0.232  (0.150) -0.317*** (0.127) 1.156***  (0.140)
Sweden 1.079***  (0.167) 0.020 (0.125) 1.908***  (0.156)
Austria 0.062  (0.155) 0.299** (0.141) 0.486***  (0.140)
Constant 1.501***  (0.281) 1.526*** (0.231) 0.801***  (0.253)
Log likelihood  -4,001.45  -5,622.07 -4,612.88 
Pseudo R2  0.080  0.074 0.091 
Wald χ
2  626.11*** 788.80*** 808.76*** 
No. of observations  10,376  9,650 9,952 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Networks variables take value 1 if the 
respondent can rely on other people outside their immediate household if she feels depressed, needs a job for herself or a 
family member, or needs to borrow money to pay an urgent bill. 
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Table 7: Individual determinants of social capital: Pooled data  
 
Overall Civic 
Participation  std. error Putnam 
Groups  std. error Olsonian 
Groups  std. error  Networks if 
depressed  std. error Networks if 
needs job  std. error Networks 
to borrow  std. error 
Female -0.240***  (0.030) -0.202*** (0.035) -0.145*** (0.041) 0.421*** (0.040) -0.077*** (0.033) 0.167*** (0.037) 
Married 0.071**  (0.036) 0.111*** (0.042) 0.336*** (0.052) -0.055 (0.046) -0.008 (0.038) 0.016 (0.042) 
Age 0.034***  (0.006) 0.031*** (0.007) 0.091*** (0.010) -0.033*** (0.007) -0.043*** (0.006) -0.038*** (0.007) 
Age squared  -0.0003***  (0.0001) -0.0003*** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 
Children 0.040***  (0.016) 0.036** (0.019) 0.146*** (0.023)  
HH Size  -0.063***  (0.014) -0.077*** (0.016) -0.168*** (0.020)  
Secondary 0.522***  (0.043) 0.489*** (0.055) 0.635*** (0.067) 0.238*** (0.051) 0.082* (0.045) 0.189*** (0.047) 
University 1.103***  (0.047) 1.063*** (0.058) 1.320*** (0.069) 0.383*** (0.059) 0.241*** (0.051) 0.401*** (0.055) 
Student 1.454***  (0.074) 1.266*** (0.090) 1.094*** (0.115) 0.626*** (0.116) 0.326*** (0.092) 0.488*** (0.102) 
Self-employed -0.200***  (0.069) -0.243*** (0.078) -0.618*** (0.091) 0.287*** (0.104) 0.295*** (0.084) 0.501*** (0.102) 
White collar  0.120***  (0.045) 0.091* (0.051) -0.026 (0.056) 0.250*** (0.066) 0.239*** (0.052) 0.226*** (0.060) 
House person  -0.338***  (0.060) -0.474*** (0.076) -0.973*** (0.094) 0.079 (0.080) -0.068 (0.064) 0.011 (0.072) 
Unemployed   -0.531***  (0.064) -0.580*** (0.078) -0.673*** (0.092) -0.311*** (0.073) -0.663*** (0.063) -0.343*** (0.067) 
Retiree -0.350**  (0.058) -0.387*** (0.070) -0.769*** (0.086) 0.023 (0.074) -0.079 (0.063) -0.056 (0.068) 
Farmer/fisherman -0.227***  (0.108) -0.266* (0.140) -0.408*** (0.159) 0.024 (0.165) 0.038 (0.142) 0.001 (0.150) 
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.162***  (0.045) 0.158*** (0.055) 0.181*** (0.066) 0.227*** (0.055) 0.253*** (0.048) 0.228*** (0.050) 
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.314***  (0.046) 0.268*** (0.056) 0.287*** (0.067) 0.284*** (0.058) 0.370*** (0.050) 0.388*** (0.054) 
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.419***  (0.050) 0.364*** (0.059) 0.320*** (0.071) 0.504*** (0.065) 0.709*** (0.054) 0.606*** (0.060) 
Small/Medium town    0.000 (0.046) -0.133*** (0.039) -0.091** (0.043) 
City   -0.063 (0.050) -0.099** (0.042) -0.167*** (0.046) 
Candidate countries  -0.949***  (0.035) 0.258*** (0.039) -1.144*** (0.051) -0.509*** (0.039) -0.735*** (0.033) -0.440*** (0.036) 
Constant   2.054*** (0.179) 1.755*** (0.151) 1.845*** (0.164) 
Log likelihood  -20,527.24  -14,013.01 -10,079.12 -8,734.46 -11,075.22 -9,840.80  
Pseudo R2  0.061  0.045 0.093 0.042 0.074 0.042  
Wald χ
2  2,435.37***  1,274.67*** 1,716.89*** 738.56*** 1,543.71*** 790.64***  
No. of observations  19,854  19,661 19,702 19,293 17,774 18531  
Notes: Estimated with logit or ordered logit; Significance levels: * 5% and ** 10%.   xii
 
Table 8: Individual and aggregate determinants of social capital: Pooled data  
 
Overall Civic 
Participation std. error Putnam 
Groups  std. error Olsonian 
Groups  std. error Networks if 
depressed  std. error Networks if 
needs job  std. error Networks to 
borrow  std. error 
Female -0.258***  (0.055)-0.220*** (0.065) -0.195*** (0.068) 0.429*** (0.060) -0.111*** (0.036) 0.124** (0.050) 
Married -0.023  (0.056) 0.011 (0.071) 0.200*** (0.066) -0.021 (0.056) -0.015 (0.037) 0.039 (0.057) 
Age 0.032***  (0.007) 0.028** (0.012) 0.087*** (0.009) -0.034*** (0.008) -0.045*** (0.006) -0.039*** (0.007) 
Age squared  -0.0003***  (0.0001)-0.0003** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 
Children -0.030  (0.027) -0.036 (0.033) 0.060 (0.039)  
HH Size  0.036  (0.023) 0.014 (0.026) -0.073** (0.029)  
Secondary 0.333***  (0.086) 0.353*** (0.112) 0.419*** (0.096) 0.193*** (0.071) 0.042 (0.063) 0.142* (0.082) 
University 0.837***  (0.090) 0.823*** (0.128) 0.908*** (0.091) 0.309*** (0.082) 0.193*** (0.067) 0.300*** (0.087) 
Student 1.153***  (0.118) 0.933*** (0.225) 0.581*** (0.195) 0.520*** (0.132) 0.265* (0.137) 0.393*** (0.144) 
Self-employed 0.039  (0.095) -0.064 (0.150) -0.363*** (0.136) 0.341*** (0.114) 0.299*** (0.090) 0.524*** (0.107) 
White collar  0.169**  (0.068) 0.129 (0.079) 0.064 (0.073) 0.274*** (0.070) 0.248*** (0.065) 0.268*** (0.064) 
House person  -0.211  (0.153) -0.394* (0.201) -0.664*** (0.247) 0.110 (0.135) 0.038 (0.095) 0.193** (0.091) 
Unemployed   -0.430***  (0.079)-0.462*** (0.095) -0.563*** (0.130) -0.281*** (0.101) -0.623*** (0.081) -0.348*** (0.082) 
Retiree -0.203**  (0.089) -0.244* (0.142) -0.676*** (0.170) 0.060 (0.078) -0.024 (0.075) -0.011 (0.077) 
Farmer/fisherman 0.159  (0.248) 0.058 (0.261) -0.070 (0.325) 0.039 (0.183) 0.108 (0.144) -0.006 (0.157) 
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.146*  (0.072) 0.128 (0.091) 0.167** (0.082) 0.182*** (0.064) 0.217*** (0.072) 0.162** (0.067) 
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.478***  (0.095) 0.426*** (0.132) 0.486*** (0.127) 0.253*** (0.082) 0.358*** (0.071) 0.340*** (0.087) 
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.513***  (0.114) 0.453*** (0.151) 0.466*** (0.170) 0.446*** (0.105) 0.709*** (0.088) 0.574*** (0.107) 
Small/Medium town    -0.025 (0.058) -0.129** (0.057) -0.081 (0.062) 
City   -0.028 (0.065) -0.057 (0.086) -0.102 (0.074) 
GDP per capita 
(thousands)  0.023 (0.024) 0.019 (0.027) 0.007 (0.022) -0.001 (0.017) 0.000 (0.018) -0.029** (0.013) 
Gini coefficient   -0.049*  (0.027) -0.071** (0.034) -0.064** (0.031) -0.008 (0.022) -0.022 (0.017) -0.004 (0.020) 
Non-corruption 0.249***  (0.092) 0.337*** (0.099) 0.461*** (0.108) 0.156 (0.102) 0.022 (0.104) 0.292*** (0.085) 
Economic Freedom   0.422**  (0.176) 0.345* (0.195) 0.116 (0.250) -0.027 (0.155) 0.161 (0.168) -0.170 (0.139) 
Candidate countries  0.942***  (0.323) 2.436*** (0.409) 0.943** (0.404) -0.042 (0.300) -0.414 (0.311) -0.220 (0.244) 
Constant     1.446 (1.173) 1.131 (0.951) 1.864* (0.957) 
F-statistics 12.88***  19.01*** 36.11*** 21.91*** 71.25*** 14.76***  
No. of observations  19019  18,841 18,882 18,460 17,010 17,758    xiii
Notes: Estimated with logit or ordered logit; Significance levels: * 5% and ** 10%. Standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that country-level and 
individual variables are observed at different levels of aggregation. GDP per capita is in thousands of US dollars adjusted for purchasing-power parity. Non-
corruption is the corruption perception index as compiled by Transparency International, higher values indicate less corruption. Economic freedom is the index 
compiled by the Frasier Institute.  
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